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Images of the Enemy: A Study of the Images of Gennans and French Collaborationists in 
the Gaullist newspaper Combat 
by Suzy Gamer 
Honors History Thesis 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
April 1997 
Introduction: The French Resistance and Combat 
The seemingly endless years of the German Occupation of France during World 
War II remain among the most controversial in the nation's history. Today this period of 
time between 1940 and 1944 serves as a bittersweet reminder of the fragility of man's 
freedom, the sweetness of his liberation, and the shamefulness of one's neighbor's 
treachery. This was a unique time in modem history when ordinary citizens could 
become heroes fighting for France fibre. Instead of physical combat, however, many 
Frenchmen chose to write and publish various clandestine newspapers and fight through 
more sophisticated means. Perhaps it was not physical freedom they sought so much as 
cultural freedom which was so obviously threatened by Nazi ideology, propaganda, and 
the censorship of the puppet government at Vichy. Indeed, it was these men and women 
who came together to form pUblications such as Combat. 
Unlike the rest of the nations involved in the Second World War, the French 
fought or, better yet, "resisted" two enemies, the Germans and themselves, thus 
presenting a dangerous and unique dilemma for the French Resistance fighter: "On one 
side of the opposition lie France, we Frenchmen, truth, courage, and dignity, on the other 
the enemy and Vichy."l Indeed, the Resistance was never a strong national movement 
nor part of the war's popular culture until after the Liberation when the Allied victory 
was clearly in sight. Nevertheless, the non-communist movement saw the Resistance as 
"a powerful popular uprising, an elan of all French patriots against the enemy and the 
1 Margaret Ata~ Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 49. 
2 
traitors in his service.,,2 Though the numbers of Resistance organizers, fighters, and 
contributors could never be ascertained, the Resistance movement was proportionally 
small in comparison to the French population, due to the dangerous cost of membership 
or association with a Resistance organization. 
Throughout this period of clandestine publishing Combat was able to distribute 
thousands of copies to French citizens, sharing various news articles, book reviews, 
editorials, and literary fiction. For instance, in its first full year, 1942, Combat published 
and circulated over 150,000 copies of its newspaper. 3 This was no two-bit publishing 
operation, and it is the information contained in Combat's articles and stories with which 
I shall concern myself in this paper. Certainly, the liberation of France was the primary 
goal not only for Combat but for all French Resistance publications. However, these 
clandestine papers portrayed somewhat different images of the enemy, both German and 
French. Though they fought on the same side against the same enemy, the publications 
produced varied images of Vichy and the German invaders. In Combat alone, the 
coverage of prominent Germans and French collaborationist leaders evolves throughout 
the history of the newspaper's publication. In this paper, I will explore, compare, and 
explain the reasons behind the different images of Germans and French collaborateurs as 
portrayed in the Gaullist clandestine newspaper Combat as they evolved from the first 
days of Ie drole de guerre (the Phony War) through the preparations for the landings at 
Normandy until DeGaulle's triumphant stroll down the Champs-Elysees in August 1944. 
2 John F. Sweets, "Oui, Mais .... The Interior Resistance Movements and DeGaulle," Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Westem Society for French History 3 (1975): 549. 
3 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French ReSistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 31. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~-----. 
I will also discuss the implications of these images on French political and cultural 
identity. 
3 
The men and women of Combat voluntarily chose to join this military and 
political Resistance organization and Gaullist publication to create an innovative and 
unique type of literature, that of war. As the resistance writers depicted the horrendous 
face of the enemy in its editorials and news coverage of prominent Germans and 
collaborationist leaders, the face or, more appropriately, the faces of the enemy came to 
share many similarities yet have distinct differences in character, depiction, and personal 
nature. These images of the barbaric German invader and the traitorous "non-French" 
collaborator became a focal point for the newspaper. Therefore, by characterizing these 
images and their common and unique qualities, I will demonstrate that these images are a 
clear reflection of the Resistance writers' ideology ofFrenchness, location, and the 
paper's political agenda. Though the creation of Combat clearly proposed to 
counterbalance German propaganda with the French resistance media and personal 
encouragement, the authors' political aims remained fixed on "une publique pure et 
dure.,,4 Perhaps then this Gaullist ideology, the political devotion to the man who 
became the symbol of the French Resistance, and the paper's location in the Unoccupied 
Southern Zone of France played a significant role not only in the politics behind the 
scenes but in the articles published by Henri Frenay, former French military officer and 
founder of Combat, and his companions in Combat. The evolution of this publication 
throughout 1944 offers rare insight into the minds behind the French Resistance and the 
writers' burden to fulfill France's cultural and political responsibility to the world. 
4 
These publications served several purposes--to share news of the resistance 
movement, to make outsiders aware of the situation in France, but most importantly, to 
maintain Francefs cultural role in Europe. Serving as an inspiration to fellow resistors, 
these writers and their publications cried out for unity among the French people and 
openly condemned the treasonous acts of their collaborationist neighbors. According to 
Henri Frenay, his newspaper was created to fill a specific need, "to counterbalance Vichy 
propaganda--to offer information denied them [citizens of France] by the official press. ,,5 
However, this periodical like so many others took on a new life of its own, publishing 
articles and creating new purposes which went beyond the obvious goal of national 
liberation. 6 Indeed, the creators (mostly supporters of General Charles DeGaulle or his 
fundamental beliefs) developed a clear purpose not only for their guerrilla fighting units 
but for their periodical as well. In a September issue of Combat, the newspaper mentions 
other conservative and communist parties and Resistance organizations but claims, 
"There will be also a great republican and revolutionary party which will renovate the 
political life of France and will build the IV Republic. ,,7 Combat and other newspapers 
like it clearly had not only a war time agenda but a political and cultural agenda they 
wished to assert. 
I. History of Combat 
Combat, the larger political and military organization which served as the 
governing body of the clandestine paper, was perhaps "the most prestigious Resistance 
4 Combat, no. 55, March] 944 . 
.5 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, ] 976) 56. 
6 After the Liberation in August 1944 the paper became decidedly more political, serving as a forum for 
former resistants to discuss what governmental measures were best for France. Publication ended in 1947. 
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group within the non-Communist left.,,8 Certainly, it was the largest with 70-75,000 
people employed in its operation.9 The clandestine paper, like the organization itself, 
had a fairly long history. The paper had humble beginnings in an old rundown business 
building with a decrepit printer. Henri Frenay, fonner French military officer and 
founder of the newspaper, had dreams of fulfilling a need in fa France fibre-the need 
for reliable infonnation among the French people. His original hopes included the 
creation of a military and political resistance organization to fight alongside the Allies 
against the Nazis, while publishing a newspaper for infonnational purposes only. 
Unaware of the future importance of the paper and the growing difficulty of finding 
credible news, Combat was "originated to fill a specific need-to counterbalance Vichy 
propaganda-offer information denied them [the French citizenry] by the official press as 
well as provide them with editorials that might provide them with some reason to keep 
on hoping." 1 0 
Combat was not the first name chosen for Frenay's new Resistance 
organization which began in 1940 after the Armistice or, in his eyes, the Defeat. 11 The 
idea for Combat developed over time, beginning with the publication of the rejuvenated 
Les Petites Ailes de France with its subtitle "Vivre dans la defaite c'est mourir tous les 
jourS.,,12 Beginning with a mimeographed sheet which eventually developed into a 
7 John F. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History of the Mouvement Unis de la 
Resistance (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976) 151. 
8 James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) 
52. 
9 John F. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History of the Mouvements Unis de 
fa Resistance (DeKalb: Northern lllinois University Press, 1976) 39. 
10 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 56. 
11 Throughout the issues of Combat from 1941-1944, the term armistice is usually referred to as the defeat. 
12 Henri Frenay, The Night Wi/I End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 182. The 
subtitle is a quotation from Napoleon. 
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properly printed journal, the paper expressed many of the same views that Combat would 
in the future. This publication folded as a result of those individuals involved in its 
publication and Frenay's desire to join forces with other similar groups which would 
ultimately enable them to be more effective. Frenay went on to combine with another 
Resistance newspaper, Verites, which was published through 1941 with the 
accompanying subtitle "Je hais les nlensonges qui vous ont tant fait de mal.,,13 Frenay 
continued to cOlnbine Resistance organizations to eventually create Combat whose first 
issue appeared in December 1941 with the accompanying subtitle (Frenay's contribution 
once again) "Dans la guerre comme dans la paix Ie demier mot est a ceux qui ne se 
rendent jamais. ,,14 
Frenay had chosen to unite with these other movements who had resisted Nazism 
and collaboration in all its forms not only to make his organization stronger, but also as 
his partner Robert Guedon claimed because there was no point in creating potential rival 
groups: "They [other rival Resistance organizations] would have cost us precious time 
and created unnecessary conflicts.,,15 Certainly, Combat called for unity among the 
French people in its articles, but the organizations with which it eventually affiliated in 
1942 were republican or Gaullist in political terms: Emanuel d' Astier de la Vigerie's 
Liberation and Jean-Pierre Levy's Franc-Tireur. 16 Contacted along with these other 
Resistance leaders in September 1942, Frenay was convinced by Jean Moulin 
13 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 186. The 
subtitle is a quotation from Marshal Petain. 
14 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
15 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 61. The 
possible conflict and rivalry among the different Resistance groups refers specifically to the Communist 
Resistance movements. 
16 Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, France 1943-45 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988) 31. 
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(DeGaulle's personal representative in France and perhaps the most popular of French 
Resistance heroes) to meet in London with De Gaulle to form the Mouvement Unis de la 
Resistance (MUR) which would ensure support for DeGaulle's Free French Forces (FFI) 
and place these Resistance movements under the leadership and command of DeGaulle.17 
Reactions among the organizations were mixed as Frenay questioned what 
specific role DeGaulle would play. Many resistants within France experienced some 
resentment towards people like DeGaulle and others in London and Algiers because they 
sometimes appeared cowardly, almost as if they had abandoned France. There was also a 
fear of manipulation by these leaders who had no real understanding of the danger 
involved or complexities of the underground movement. Nevertheless, Frenay did admit 
that his own political views corresponded with those of De Gaulle when his newspaper 
called for a movement toward "une republique pure et dure.,,18 In essence, Frenay joined 
forces with DeGaulle because they agreed on several fundamental issues: 
The Resistance, the true Resistance, that of the men of the first hour, never felt 
that it owed its existence to the call of June 18 .... we derived our mission from 
our conscience alone and from our will. Our attachment to [DeGaulle] was 
spontaneous and voluntary .... Because we were not 'charge de mission, ' but free 
men, accepting fully his authority, we brought him the support of a captive but 
struggling France. 19 
It was fairly easy to persuade Frenay when Moulin and DeGaulle offered monetary 
support; thus, they would be able to accomplish more with their operation by purchasing 
17 Ibid., 31. 
18 Henri Frenay, introduction, The Night Will End by Henri Frenay, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976) xiv. 
19 Quoted in John F. Sweets, "Oui, Mais .... The Interior Resistance Movements and DeGaulle," Proceedings 
Of the Annual Meeting Of the Western SOCiety for French History 3 (1975): 543. The quote to which the 
author refers appears in "DeGaulle et la Resistance," Preuves, no. 70, December 1965, p. 84. 
and securing arms for their Armee Secrete.20 There was no doubt that DeGaulle was a 
benefit to the operation. The Resistance movements accepted the authority of De Gaulle, 
yet sometimes they asserted their military and literary independence because they felt 
their role in creating the Resistance movement gave them special consideration and 
privileges. 
Though the clandestine paper Combat was partially funded by DeGaulle and 
considered itself a part of a Gaullist organization, that did not necessarily mean that all 
the writers were republican or even pro-Gaullist. DeGaulle could not control every 
operation of the underground movement. The group of writers, participants, and 
contributors included French rightists, Jews, Freemasons, and even a few communists.21 
Like many of the other first Resistance groups, Combat included a high proportion of 
army officers dissatisfied with current events, trade unionists, and "declasse 
intellectuals.,,22 Many considered themselves '<;de-facto Gaullists" who felt that French 
unity and control over the community were more important than political affiliation. 23 
Furthermore, most were employed in fairly "liberal professions" such as professors and 
journalists who were involved in both the writing and military operations of the 
movement. Combat was composed primarily of individuals with leftist political 
tendencies, forming a mass movement with revolutionary aims which Frenay readily 
admitted: "We wanted a social revolution.,,24 Perhaps what truly united this eclectic 
20 The Annre Secrete refers to the guerrilla forces of Combat. 
21 Ibid., 70. 
8 
22 Jonathon H. King, "Emmanuel d' Astier and the Nature of the French Resistance," European Studies 
Review 8.4 (1973): 32. D' Astier was from a highly aristocratic family with a tradition of service in the navy 
and diplomatic corps. 
23 Hilaty Footitt and John Simmonds, France 1943-1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press., 1988) 31. 
24 Henri Frenay, introduction, The Night Will End by Henri Frenay, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976) xv. 
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group was an attachment to the Romantic ideas of the French past and its superior French 
culture which resulted in an attraction to the political left so that this cultural superiority 
could be expressed freely. However, as one reads the various issues (particularly those 
printed after the creation of the MUR) of Combat, it is undoubtedly a strongly pro .. 
Gaullist paper with this affiliation being mentioned in virtually every issue after 1942. 
Combat's writers' sense of mission for the Resistance is clear-unity against the 
German Occupation and Vichy. While Combat did not focus on publishing short stories, 
novelettes, or book reviews like the more literary based Les Lettres Franr;aises, it did 
print articles, editorials, and respectable news reports meant to inform the French. The 
journalists involved in such operations wanted to avoid not only the tactics of German 
propaganda, but they refused to return to the unpopular and unethical practices in 
journalistic reporting that had haunted the profession in the 1930's.25 The French press 
of the 1930's could only be described as scandalous and biased, "consciously exploiting 
the prejudices of its readers." It was naturally a part of the Resistance theology when in 
1940 the Comite Nationale de Resistance (CNR), of which Combat was a part, called for 
freedom of the press "with respect to the state, moneied interests, and foreign influences" 
because the French journalistic establishment had yielded to all these vices in the past. 26 
Furthermore, they did not want to be compared to the propaganda produced by the 
Germans and their infamous Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels. They did 
not want to dictate public opinion but encourage "active cooperation" in judging the 
25 James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) 
60. 
26 Ibid., 60 
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reliability of news reports while encouraging readers to draw the "appropriate" 
conclusions from the events covered in the paper.27 
The press would serve as an example of open-mindedness and courageousness, 
crusading for the truth, which would thus encourage readers to rise to the occasion and 
revolt against the German invader. Undoubtedly, it was this sense of purpose which 
attracted Albert Camus to join the ranks of its writers in 1943. According to Camus, the 
role of the Liberation press was "to awaken [the reader's] critical faculties rather than 
appealing to his spirit of complacency. ,,28 Camus was undoubtedly among the most 
prominent writers for Combat and with his help, the paper's general reputation in France, 
England, and most importantly, among other Resistance organizations was without 
reproach. 
The newspaper served not only as a reliable source of information and news; it 
was ultimately a call to action as it often gave explicit orders to encourage resistance. 29 
Moreover, it offered a choice to its readers, Resistance or capitulation: "Sa position etant 
ainsi clairement definie, chaque Fran~ais pourra choisir: il sera avec ou contre nous. ,,30 
The roles of the Resistance fighter, the German/Nazi invader and the infamous 
collaborateur were clearly defined. Indeed, Frenayand his Combat cohorts were not 
only clear in creating a specific purpose, but they also created memorable and distinct 
images of the enemy whether he be French or German. 
Many of these images were popular among contemporary clandestine papers, but 
some were distinctly Gaullist and perhaps "combatant" in nature. Of course, there are 
27 Ibid., 59. 
28 Combat, no. 59, August 1944. 
29 Combat, no. 2, December 1941. 
11 
varying reasons for the different images, namely the ideology of Frenchness, the location 
of the Resistance movement in the Unoccupied (Southern) Zone, and finally, the political 
agenda which the newspaper chose to assert. 31 Though originally intended to serve a 
secondary role, supplementing the more important and successful military and political 
operations of Combat, Combat, as the representative paper for the greater organization, 
soon began to playa new and vital, yet unforeseen, role in the Resistance movement as it 
provided the French people with solidarity. Frenay readily admits in his autobiography: 
"People sometimes forgot the name of our movement but never that of our paper.,,32 
ll. Images of Nazi Germany and the Germans 
The figure or image of the GermanINazi enemy is complex and partially the result 
ofa long history of French and German animosity. The veritable plethora of literature 
written before the Second World War is infamous and often filled with stereotypical 
German characters. Perhaps the feelings between Germans and the French could be best 
described as a love-hate relationship. Like the rest of Europe, the French people 
admired German achievements in the sciences and fine arts (music) which influenced 
Europe in the 1920's and 1930's-the Germany of Kant, Goethe, and Beethoven. They 
admired their passion, yet at the same time recognized their idealistic and naive nature. 
However, as a part of this image, many French writers also found Germans perhaps too 
"ponderous" and somewhat "submissive," often lacking individuality and initiative. 33 
30 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
31 Frenchness is used to illustrate the sense of cultural and political superiority which. according to Combat, 
made the Germans inferior to the French. 
32 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw·HiIl, 1976) 56. 
33 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1955 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 58. 
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Nevertheless, there remained a contrasting view of the typical allemand. The 
Franco .. Prussian War of 1870 had been a major turning point in French literature as it 
introduced the new phenomenon (which was not reserved for the French only)-"les 
deux Allemagnes." These contrasting images and resentment promoted the idea of an 
internal German conflict, "Goethe and culture versus Bismarck and Prussian 
militarism. ,,34 These stereotypical identities of German characters and character traits 
did not play major roles in the literature from the First World War, but the rise of Nazi 
Germany offered these French authors the opportunity to revive these images of Germany 
and its people. The writers of Combat were also quick to exploit these common fictitious 
images and maintained such stereotypes while contributing some of their own, perhaps 
with a bit of a Gaullist touch. 
The typical German character depicted was that of a barbarian/monster created by 
his Teutonic, mythical past His "irrational, demonic soul" is best illustrated by German 
romanticism and Wagner.35 The second Germany is perhaps best captured by Vercors in 
his Resistance novelette Le Silence de fa Mer-aristocratic, quiet, learned, musical, and 
most importantly, appreciative of French culture. Therefore, it is obvious that the writers 
of the Resistance and Combat were extremely familiar with these stereotypes and 
unafraid to utilize the images from the French literary tradition, often exemplified by "the 
musical German, the aristocratic Prussian officer, [or] the stupid German private 
soldier. ,,36 Combat was prepared not only to report the news but to exploit these images, 
34 Ibid., 58. 
35 Ibid., 58 
36 S. Beynon Jo~ "The Ambiguous Invader: Images of Gennans in Some French Fiction About the 
Occupation of 1940-1944," Journal 0/ European Studies: Literature and Ideas/rom the Renaissance to the 
Present 16 (1986): 187. 
13 
playing on the fears and ignorance of the French people so that their propaganda would 
be just as effective as that produced by Nazi Germany. 
The image which dominates the pages of Combat is the idea that the Gennan 
Occupation is not merely an invasion or conquest of France but a Holy War between 
France and "l'ennemi hereditaire.,,37 Perhaps the most obvious example or illustration is 
the proud symbol of De Gaulle-the cross ofLorraine--integrated into the "c" of Combat 
in each issue's title beginning in October 1942. The articles also make mention of the 
cross: "Fiers de nos morts et de notre croix de lorraine, nous sommes fiers de notre 
chef,,38 In the first article of the issue, the war is clearly portrayed as a French crusade 
against the barbaric German invaders from the East, depicted much like the Arabs or 
Turks from the Crusades of the medieval era: "Organisons ensemble la Croisade de la 
Verite contre Ie Mensonge, du Bien contre Ie Mal, du Christianisme contre Ie Paganisme, 
de la Liberte contre 1 'Esc lavage. ,,39 The articles composed by DeGaulle specifically 
portray the victory of France over Germany as a "victoire fran~aise et humanisme" which 
would require sacrifices as ifall Germans were Pagans whom "nous (the Resistance 
fighters] vaincrons,,40 
Combat goes even further to portray these so-called barbarians as pillaging 
thieves by publishing explicit lists of items and resources stolen throughout the invasion 
and Occupation. 4 I Those dying for the cause of France become not only heroes but 
37 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 58. 
38 Combat, no. 43, April 1943. 
39 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
40 Combat, no. 30, May 1942. 
41 Combat, no. 33, August 1942. 
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martyrs.42 The writers even go so far as to offer formal blessings to the Frenchmen 
fighting the Germans: "Grace a la resistance, grace a ceux que la presse germans-
vichyate appelle des IOterroristes.,,,43 By portraying the invasion and occupation of France 
as a Holy War or a crusade, the German occupiers become all the more despicable. By 
offering this blessing to both the occupier and the occupied French, Frenay, DeGaulle, 
and the rest of the writing staff appeared that much kinder--thus, superior to the 
Germans in their tolerance of foreign cultures. Furthermore, Combat continues the 
metaphor of the Holy War by referring to Hitler's Mein Kemp/as "la Bible du nouveau 
pangermanisme" which certainly may have been true, but the assumption is made that all 
Germans must agree with Hitler or think the same way.44 Indeed, the Germans are 
portrayed as virtually inhuman, thus making the French Resistance writers guilty of some 
of the same beliefs as the Nazis. This distinction contributed to the idea of Frenchness in 
that the real, resistant French could never behave like a German, like a virtual barbarian. 
Unfortunately, the writers of Combat discovered all too son just how barbaric the French 
could be. 
In the popular French literary tradition and perhaps as an outgrowth of the 
metaphorical image of the French-German Holy War, Combat portrays the German 
invaders of the Northern Zone as barbaric. Not only are these heathens invading their 
nation, but they are taking over their culture. Throughout the issues of Combat between 
1940-1944, the writers suggest or, more appropriately, command not only their readers 
but all of France to resist German culture. They consistently warn against believing in 
42 Combat, no. 46, August 1943. 
43 Combat, no. 54, February 1944. 
44 Combat, no. 28, March 1942. 
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the promises or the threats of German propaganda. For instance, they plead for the reel 
French people to boycott German films being shown in Parisian theaters during this 
time.45 In several issues they also refer to the Germans as "les boches" which is used as a 
derogatory term.46 Moreover, Combat quickly detected the danger of volunteering to 
work in German factories before it became well-known what occurred within them. As 
early as 1942, the French writers of Combat exposed the barbaric possibilities of these 
opportunities in Germany yet satirically commended them for "une belle orchestration" 
of this operation.47 The German soldier becomes inhuman as well; he is a part ofa 
greater force which must be destroyed or vanquished. Once again, the French Resistance 
fighters utilized humanism to present Nazism/Germanism in a negative light because of 
its rejection of individual importance over the collective group or nation-state. 48 
Another image which is less popular than that of the German barbarian is the 
depiction of Germans as "negriers" or slave traders. Throughout the issues of Combat 
there are countless references to the Occupation as the enslavement of France by the 
Gennan nation. The writers describe Occupied France as "la France allemande," filled 
with young French slaves who are desolating the field of France.49 They complain of the 
slave-like abuse of France and other nations' resources whose only purpose is to supply 
the German nation: "La TC!colte-allemande profite tout entiere au peuple allemand, qui 
reyoit en outre des surplus venant des territoires conquis. ,,50 Therefore, the choice they 
45 Combat, no. 2, December 1941. 
46 Combat, no. 2, December 1941; Combat, no. 43, April 1943. This term is often used to describe 
foreigners in a derogatory manner such as the Huns or the Krauts. 
47 Combat, no. 32. July 1942. 
48 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 61. 
49 Combat, no. 28, March 1942. 
50 Combat, no. 35, October 1942. 
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offer is clear: "C'est l'independance ou l'esclavage.,,51 The image of the German slave 
trader and France in bondage takes two further forms. Firstly, the Nazis are depicted as 
slave traders-selling French culture, trading away the French dream of "liberte, egalite, 
et fratemite. ,,52 Secondly, this image of the slave trader takes a more realistic form. 
Numerous articles appear about the infamous deportations of French citizens. They are 
described not only as thieves, stealing this labor unscrupulously, but as indifferent 
soldiers who enjoy robbing the nation: "lIs ont trouve pour cela des trafiquants prets a 
leur vendre Ie travail d' ouvriers fran~ais. ,,53 Perhaps out of all the images and depictions 
of Germans in Combat (or in all of French Resistance Literature for that matter) the 
image of the slave trader is not only the most disturbing but, sadly, the most truthful. 
Throughout these issues of Combat admittedly there are numerous images of 
Germans and Nazis, yet the most interesting and enlightening aspect of these images is 
the transformations which they undergo over time. Between the years 1940 .. 1944, the 
most obvious change among the depictions of Germans is the evolution from the German 
versus the Nazi conflict to the idea that being German is equated with being Nazi. Only 
Germans could truly understand the predicament of France and its Resistance effort 
because they, too, were forced to endure the internal conflict of the war, often fighting 
fellow citizens. However, Combat never makes mention of this comparison or 
commonality. Indeed, as time passed whatever distinction had been made between 
Germany and Nazism was nonexistent. 
51 Combat, no. 30, May 1942. 
52 Combat, no. 39, January 1943. 
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The fact that there was once a distinction was fairly rare among clandestine 
newspapers. Frenay even admitted, "Like myself, some resistants made a clear 
distinction between Hitler and Germany, but they were very few. For the vast majority, 
Nazism was only the most recent manifestation of an eternal Teutonism.,,54 This 
sentiment was clearly reflected in his clandestine paper. In the early publications 
Combat is extremely careful in describing the Gernlan enemy as "Hitleran" or Nazi. For 
instance, in its first issue in December 1941, Pasteur B. warned, "Sa seule force est de 
savoir organiser Ie mensonge nazi." Gernlans or all of Germany is never referred to as the 
collective enemy.55 However, by late 1942, the two become virtually indistinguishable. 
For instance, Combat comes right out to claim: "L'ennemi c'est Allemand et ses valets 
de Vichy.,,56 Moreover, it is not the Nazis or the German Army with whom they wage 
war but all of Germany: "La verite est qu'aujourd'hui l'Allemagne n'a pas seulement 
declenche une offensive contre les milleurs et les plus fiers de nos compatriotes, elle 
continue aussi la guerre contre la totalite de la France. ,,57 Furthermore, the ternl German 
became more hated everyday. When the authors wanted to denounce or expose a 
prominent Vichy leader or another collaborator, the easiest way to discredit and shame 
him was to depict him as German. 58 What could be worse to a Frenchman, especially to 
such an intellectual who (particularly during the World War IT era) prides himself and his 
country on its cultural role, than to be compared to a German? Indeed, in four years time, 
the image of the enemy evolves from "la croisade euro¢ene contre nazisme" to 
54 Henri Frenay, The Night Will End, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) 70. 
55 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
56 Combat, no. 46, August 1943. 
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"l'ennemi c'est Allemand.,.,s9 Certainly, this is partly the result of years under the 
Occupation, yet the evolution of the German throughout Combat is very closely related to 
that of the collaborator; thus, one must first understand the contrasting and similar 
attributes of the collaboration in order to understand the purposes and perhaps the 
excuses behind them. Moreover, the ideas of these resistants also enable one to see just 
what an impact they had during the war and post-war periods when DeGaulle became 
President of the IV Republic. 
ill. Images of the Collaboration 
The image of the French collaborator is, of course, a bit more complicated than 
that of the German because of the situation in France during the Occupation; it was 
simply a little too close to home. The relationship between the two could not be 
described nlerely as exploited versus exploiter; the relationship was too complicated. In 
certain ways the figure of the French enemy is not altogether different from the German 
image. The collaborator was denounced as either a national traitor, enemy agent, or as a 
fascist oppressor.60 According to the writers of Combat, the French people clearly had a 
choice: "Sa position etant ainsi clairement definie, chaque Fran9ais pourra choisir: il 
sera avec ou contre nous. ,,61 Moreover, the so-called armistice was just a farce or a 
deception by the Germans; it was not the peace which les collaborateurs made it out to 
be. Oftentimes, the collaborators beconle monstrous and despicable (like the Germans). 
The collaborators are utterly rejected in political terms as the enemy of the French 
people. Their allegiance was no longer to the state but to their selfish desires, power, and 
59 Combat, no. 1, December 1941; Combat, no. 46, August 1943. 
60 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
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prestige. Collaborators are rarely referred to as coIIaborators; the tenn is too 
euphemistic. Instead, they are described as the enemy, traitors, murderers, or 
accomplices: "La 'France allemande' se constitue avec la complicite des traites.,,62 
Therefore, the challenge offered by the Resistance writers is: "Les paysans franyais Ie 
permettront-ilsT,63 Would the French stand idly by while their nation was destroyed by 
foreign invaders? 
Another fascinating aspect of the French collaborationist image is the pure hatred 
experienced by the Resistance writers toward their traitorous neighbors. Perhaps the 
most biting insult or description is the reference to the collaborator as being despised by 
his newfound German allies and comrades.64 In this same article, they criticize the 
French for describing or making their treachery less than what it truly is by utilizing the 
euphemism of l' Annee de Transition rather than the Army of Vichy or German France.65 
These accomplices are often listed and denounced as traitors. The writers of Combat are 
unafraid to openly denounce collaborators. From the very beginning they condemn high 
ranking Vichy officials and their supporters such as Pierre Laval, Admiral Darlan, 
General Weygand, and eventually the former Great War hero, Marshall Petain.66 It is 
these "agents aux Nazis" who are ultimately responsible for the defeat of France which is 
very similar to the "stab in the back" theory which the Nazis used to explain the German 
loss during the First World War.67 Germany was by no means stronger~ it is just that the 
61 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
62 Combat, no. 28, March 1942. 
63 Combat, no. 28, March 1942. 
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collaborators allowed the defeat to occur. It was these traitors whom the citizens of 
unoccupied France, la France libre, saw as their real enemy. If it were not for them, 
there would be no German Occupation. 
These accomplices are ultimately not worthy to be French because they were 
willing to sacrifice their morals, loyalty, and freedom and also because they voluntarily 
betrayed their cultural heritage, their Frenchness. By deceiving their fellow citizens and 
their national history, the French collaborators created a divided France, the France of 
Vichy and the real, resistant France. An extremely revealing article clearly states the 
difference between "les verites" between us [resistant France] and them 
[collaborators]. 68 The treacherous nature of the collaborator is contrasted against the 
freedom-loving, loyal Resistance fighter. Their honor, liberty, and socialism are 
compared with that of the real French, emphasizing the differences between the role of 
the collaborator with Germany and the independent spirit of the Resistance. 
Numerous articles throughout the paper's history from 1940-1944 focus on the 
perilous and precarious position of the collaborator, as Combat constantly refers to the 
threat of deportation if one's views do not necessarily correspond with the dogma of Nazi 
ideology. For example, the author of one article clearly describes the status of the French 
working class who willingly submits or accepts the Gennan victory as "la classe ouvriere 
affamee, asservie, et deportee. ,,69 In its attempt to appeal to the nationalistic tendencies 
in its reader, Combat contrasts "liberte, egalite, et fratemite" of "notre France" with the 
"malheur, terreur, deshonneur" of "leur France allemande.~'70 Frenay explains in his 
68 Combat, no. 38, December 1942. 
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article "Le Peuple a Choisi" that the people of France must make a choice; however, it is 
not between the two men representative of the two Frances, DeGaulle and Petain. They 
must choose between "les valeurs," once again illustrating the cultural values such as 
loyalty and freedom which France supposedly represents. 71 Furthermore, this difference 
becomes a bit more political in February 1944 when Combat prints an article which 
clearly explains that there is only one type of government suitable for France., rule of the 
French by the French, yet this government is clearly meant to be a Gaullist govemment.72 
Another important distinction between these two Frances or Frenchmen is 
primarily culturaL It is apparent that the writers of Combat have a deep appreciation of 
France and its cultural role andlor leadership in twentieth century Europe, otherwise 
these men and women would not deem it important enough to publish a paper, fighting 
for its preservation and survivaL The assumption is also made that the real leaders of the 
Free French are also numbered among this so-called elite. Indeed, one article in the April 
issue is entitled "A I 'Elite" which is obviously an appeal to the French intelligentsia to 
take up arms and actively resist and "combat" the enemy.73 Throughout the paper France 
and les franr;ais are encouraged in such a way. However, the collaborationist can not be 
included in this French culture or described as appreciating it because he was wiIIing to 
make the this virtual devil' s pact, accepting the culture of the barbarians over his own. 
Therefore, the collaborators become everything which the supposedly Free French are 
not. For instance, the following is a description of Dan land Joseph who was the 
voluntary secretary general of the Gestapo in France: "Damand n'est ni un brillant 
71 Combat, no. 43, April 1943. 
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canseur, ni un intellectuel, il est un Fran~ais moyen qui ne s'embarrasse pas de 
prejuges. ,,74 Furthermore, the milice, perhaps the most hated of all collaborators, are 
depicted as killing not only other Frenchmen but killing France itself "Elle [the milice J 
consiste apparement a prendre des otages, a tuer l'intellectuel et l'ouvrier, a tortuer et a 
humilier pour, ensuite, profitant d'une presse a genoux, couvrir ses victimes de 
mensonges ou d'insultes.,,75 
Combat takes this image one step further as the contrast between the two Frances 
is illustrated by comparing its leadership. Frenay portrays DeGaulle as the head or 
"chef' of the real France who epitomizes all that Petain is not: "Marechal Petain qui 
symbolise la politique de capitulation, puis de trahison, de s'etre range aux ordres de 
Darlan, de s'etre entouri d'hommes qui ont ete les soutiens tenaces d'un regime 
abhorre.,,76 DeGaulle is later described as the savior of France: "Le General DeGaulle, 
au contraire, n'ajamais varie. Son appel du 18 juin 1940, alors que tout semblait perdu, 
fut la lumiere dans les tenebres, un cri de foi et d'espoir, un appel prophetique qui 
marque Ie debut de la resurrection fran~aise. Seul, ou presque seul, il sauve l'honneur.,,77 
Perhaps the most controversial image of the collaborationist and certainly a 
unique trait of Combat is its portrayal of Marshal Petain. It seems as if the people of 
France, just like these writers, spent a great deal of time attempting to reconcile the old 
Petain, the great military commander of the First World War and the hero of Verdun, 
with his new role as the leader of Vichy. Combat was at first very willing to give Petain 
a chance, seeing him possibly as the modem Protector of France and her culture. In the 
74 Combat, no. 54, February 1944. 
15 Combat, no. 55, April 1944. 
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paper's second issue it clearly states its political doctrine that the accession of power by 
Petain to the office of Chief of the Vichy State calmed their apprehensions; they even 
saw him as a savior: "Nous pensions que Ie Marechal etait Ie seul homme capable de 
tirer Ie meilleur parti d'une situation compromise par la defaite et l' Armistice. ,,78 The 
distinction between Petain and other Vichy officials such as Pucheu, Lehideux, and 
Marion is clear. They do not consider them to be of the same caliber or perhaps to be as 
French: "Notre attitude vis a vis du Marechal est claire. En lui, il y a deux hommes: 
celui de la Grande Guerre que nous respectons. Celui de la Collaboration que nous nous 
refusons de suivre." 79 They refuse to be duped by these real traitors even as the 
deportations begin in the Northern Zone and are first reported in March 1942.80 
However, Petain's image begins to develop, evolving from "Ie Pere Ia Victoire" to "Ie 
Pere la Defaite.,,81 In this issue Combat proclaims that France is dead. After Petain's 
declaration of his new policy or devise to correct and revue France; the writers of 
Combat realized that "la France n'a plus de Marechal saut Ie Marechal de Vichy.,,82 
These writers gave up on the Petainist myth, rejecting the hope that the Gaullist groups 
had shared that DeGaulle could be the sword of France while Petain remained its 
shield.83 The new state policy of Work, Family, and Country are depicted as forced 
labor, dislocation, and abandonment. 84 Petain is declared guilty not only of collaborating 
77 Combat, no. 43, April 1943. 
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but of betraying the national conscience and France's most sacred traditions.85 Frenay 
was very intuitive and extremely harsh when he claimed, "Le peuple a juge .... et 
condamne avant l'histoire.,,86 Therefore, as Liberation draws inevitably closer the once 
respected and beloved Marshal becomes the epitome of collaboration and treason, often 
serving as DeGaulle's adversary. 
Throughout the German Occupation various images of the collaborator appear. 
Undoubtedly, this image is negative, almost to the point of hatred. The French 
collaborationist is also mentioned much more than the German enemy. Though most 
associate Petain's name with France's dark and shameful period of collaboration, Pierre 
Laval, Petain' s second in command remains in Combat's eyes the most barbaric and 
despicable character of Vichy and the French collaboration. Even by December of 1942, 
the Governor of Madagascar who contributed to the periodical describes Laval using 
Petain's good name or at least the good which is left of it: "Petain nomme Laval 
dictateur et lui offre encore son nom pour couvrir toutes ses ignomines. ,,87 The fact 
remains that the overall image of the collaborator is just that--ignominious. Other than 
Petain and what was left of his heroic First World War image, there is nothing redeeming 
about the collaborator and his newfound Germanness. However, the treatment of 
collaborators does undergo an evolution of sorts. 
In the beginning the collaborator is a traitor, an accomplice, and ultimately the 
enemy, remaining so till the end. Yet, there remains an e1ement of hope that the 
collaboration can be swayed. Many of the issues throughout 1942 contain heartfelt pleas 
85 Combat, no. 35, October 1942. 
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to the collaborationist to change his ways, to stop saying that this fight does not concern 
him, and to actively resist, and combat the enemy. This tone of optimism or hope 
eventually fades so that by December 1942 the writers become consumed not with the 
betrayal of the collaboration but with the complicated and controversial duty of 
judgement both now and after the Allied victory. Borrowing a quote from Charles 
Maurras writing for I 'Action Fran9aise to describe Laval, the writers become not just 
resistors or resistants but judges: "Dans Ie fond de sa conscience si son interet particulier 
re<;ommen<;ait a concorder avec eux, illes jugerait meme meilleurs.,,88 Indeed, the real 
France sits in judgement over its treasonous deceivers: "La France a juge. Elle sait, 
l'experience vient de Ie lui prouver, les erreurs de jugement qu'elle a pu faire.,,89 The 
hostility and hatred toward the collaborator become almost personal as one article warns 
not to hide his or her thoughts but to be conscience of one's power: "N arguez 
l' ennemi. ,,90 
This vindictive trend continues even through 1943 as neutrality becomes an 
impossibility: "Le temps vient ou les hommes de ce pays ne seront plus juges sur leurs 
intentions, mais sur leurs actes que leurs paroles ont engages. Cela seul est juste. ,,91 As 
this confrontation becomes inevitable, it is clear that a majority of the writers in this 
Resistance movement feel strongly not only that the guilty should be judged, but that it is 
necessary for the survival of France and her history. Albert Camus who began writing for 
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the paper in 1943 even admits in 1944 Gust after the Liberation) that this controversial 
and unprecedented period of history calls for the real, resistant France to destroy a still 
living part of the nation in order to save France's soul, her unity in Frenchness.92 
Collaboration was certainly a political and military threat to France during the 
Occupation, but the threat to French cultural heritage seems more of a monumental loss 
than do the thousands of French lives lost during the war effort, resistance, or 
deportation. This is a somewhat sad commentary on the writers of Combat, making it 
easier for them to discuss and even call for the judgement and death of those involved 
with Germany and Vichy. In times of war, as one is faced with not only the death of him 
or herself but with that of his or her nation and society, this change in the treatment of 
French collaborationists is easier to understand as we remind ourselves to be careful 
when we judge others. 
IV. Reasons Behind the Images 
As we understand how these images are portrayed and evolve, it is just as 
important to analyze why these images exist. Why are there both shared and unique traits 
among the Germans and collaborators? What would lead them to depict these Germans 
and collaborators in such light? The influence of the French literary tradition and 
national animosity between Germany and France can readily be seen in virtually every 
issue, yet these are not the central reasons behind the images which dominate the pages 
of Combat. A distinct ideology ofFrenchness develops in the clandestine paper, asserting 
that the real France is superior in strength and culture to both Germany and Vichy. The 
battle against both is portrayed negatively and reinforces the image of this struggle as a 
92 Combat, no. 61, October 1944. 
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"national confrontation. ,),93 The enemy whether French or Gennan is separated from the 
real, resistant France by his "otherness." The collaborators do not fit into the real French 
tradition because they have taken on what are considered to be German national 
characteristics such as barbarism, avarice,) and greed which do not support the values of 
France which according to Combat have become intellectualism, elitism, generosity, and 
freedom. This is clearly illustrated time and again as the difference and superiority of 
real France is explored in its pages. Frenay even goes so far as to claim that Petain does 
not even know how to speak the language of France; only DeGaulle and his resistance 
do.94 The Germans are inherently the national enemy of France; thus, the distinction 
between the two is clear. 
As the issue of collaboration and the German Occupation continue to be 
addressed throughout these years of German domination, it becomes evident that the two 
nations are not held to the same standards, culturally and politically. Perhaps the best 
way to illustrate this point is to compare the French reactions to the rise of Nazism and 
the government at Vichy. The rise of Nazism was merely proof of the victory of Gemlan 
barbarism over German humanism, the death of a culturally competitive Germany. With 
Petain's rise to power and the establishment of a collaborationist regime, the writers of 
Combat see this establishment of a puppet government at Vichy as an opportunity for 
Free France to overcome this barbaric invasion of their country and their people. Those 
who are responsible for the collaboration are not nunlbered among the real, the Resistant 
93 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 75. 
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French. They sold their national heritage and their birthright, maintaining their allegiance 
not to God and country but to money, power, and an inferior German culture. 
The writers of Combat are very careful in making comparisons and emphasizing 
certain distinctions between France and Germany. For instance, France is faced with the 
unique and truly horrible national struggle between essentially two Frances. Very few 
nations understood the predicament because they remained either active supporters of a 
greater Germany and its accompanying Nazi ideology, like Austria, or vehement 
resistors, fighting in opposition to this cruel and racist form of pan-Germanism, like 
Poland. Unlike these nations France was divided (not necessarily equally) between those 
who welcomed Nazi domination and those who fought the German Occupation. It seems 
obvious that the only nation which could truly have a common bond or link with the 
French experience was Germany. Though its Resistance movement was not quite as 
large as that of France, Germany faced the same internal conflict, fighting fellow 
Germans and suffering as they or their loved ones were carted otrto concentration 
camps, often never to be heard from again. Combat makes no mention of this shared and 
difficult struggle of a nation against itself. Instead, the real French are portrayed as 
heroes fighting these traitorous col1aborationists while the Germans seem incapable of 
such division as they are lumped together as Hitleran agents, subservient to Nazi 
ideology. 
Another interesting comparison which the writers of Combat seem to miss or 
perhaps blatantly ignore concerns the role of the collaborator and the deportations of 
French men and women to Nazi concentration camps in the East or those established in 
France itself Once again the innocence and superiority of France seems to come into 
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play. Throughout the history of the journal there is no mention of France's involvement 
in deporting thousands of her own to concentration camps. Though Vichy and Petain 
himself are condemned for allowing the Germans to deport French Jews and political 
prisoners., never does this clandestine paper condemn Petain or Laval for purposely and 
personally deporting French men and women when Vichy, unfortunately, actively 
collaborated with the Nazis by sending their own citizens as slave labor to Germany and 
by establishing such camps within France's boundaries. Indeed, the French are never 
referred to as negriers or slave traders as are the Germans. 
The Resistance literature produced by Frenay" s Combat follows what Robert 
Pickering describes as the "repressive code" as the writers describe Gennany and France, 
depicting and stereotyping Germans, Nazis, and collaborators throughout the paper's 
history.95 This code is characterized by an absence of references to internal division of 
the French speaking community. Though it is clear that two Frances do exist, they are 
never portrayed as two Frances or one divided nation. Instead one is the real France 
while the other remains un-French, apart from the Frenchmen involved in the Resistance 
movement. This code is also characterized by its references to the German enemy based 
on the depiction of the Germans' otherness or foreigness, focusing on the peculiarity of 
their culture or the difference between them and Frenchmen. Combat follows these 
examples distinctly as it describes Germany as barbaric and almost less than human, but 
definitely less than French. The difference is perhaps most evident as all Germans are 
equated with Nazism, whereas this could not be said of the French. This ideology of real 
Frenchness and its alleged superiority (as expressed by the writers of Combat) illustrate 
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not only how these images emerge but why the German stereotype remains dominant and 
fairly unimaginative. The collaborator and the definition of collaboration become the 
center of controversy both during and after the war. Certainly, it was more difficult to 
admit to the betrayal of the enemy than the betrayal of one's national brethren. 
The location of Combat'8 headquarters in the Unoccupied or Free Zone of France 
is also extremely important in understanding these images of the French and Germans. In 
the paper's very first issue it is explained that this journal, though published in the Free 
Zone, was written for all Frenchmen but recognized the important differences which 
existed between the Occupied and Unoccupied territories of France: "IIs [the feelings of 
the people] sont differents en zone libre et en zone occupee, ils n'atteignent qu'un petit 
nombre de la population fran~aise. En un mot, ils n'ont pas realise ]'union.,,96 Location 
played a large role in the evolution of the image ofPetain and the Vichy government. 
Because the writers and the organization were headquartered under French control, they 
at first felt secure in believing that the Vichy government would save France; being 
under any French control was undoubtedly better than being under Gennan domination. 
Georges Bidault, Catholic journalist and director of the Information and Press Bureau, 
though surprised at the number of Germans in the Free Zone when he first arrived, 
explained this general sentiment: "The Vichy government did not yet cooperate with the 
enemy as it did later on; it had not reached the final stages of 'collaborationisme' as we 
were to call it. Vichy tolerated, sometimes even helped, people to do things which would 
95 Robert Pickering, "Writing Under Vichy," Vichy France and the Resistance: Culture and Ideology, eds. 
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have been impossible in the Occupied Zone . .,,97 Therefore, it is easy to understand how 
those writing for Combat would place their trust in Petain if his government granted them 
leniency in the beginning. As events transpired over the next four years, these writers 
came to understand that Petain had betrayed their country. Admittedly, there are more 
articles devoted to the betrayal of Vichy and its Nazi agents, primarily because the 
dictatorship under which they suffered and endured was French. Though the Nazis and 
Germany were still seen as the enemy, the German threat became almost secondary in 
nature. The mentality between the two zones was quite different. In the Occupied 
territory opposition to the barbaric Germans and their cruel Occupation overrode all other 
duties and responsibilities, whereas in the free zone, opposition to the Vichy government 
and its laws became almost inseparable from the opposition to Nazism.98 Therefore, the 
writers of Combat addressed this threat, warning their readers not to give in to this 
collaboration, this betrayal, and creating an image of the French collaboration as even 
more despicable than the Nazis. 
A sense of abandonment pervades these issues as if these collaborators value 
power and prestige over their own country. Those in the Unoccupied Zone had to face 
this everyday; thus it is arguably understandable that the Resistance movement in the 
Free Zone would not hesitate to express this resentment. The image of the collaborator is 
fairly varied, depending about whom one is talking. The collaboration also undergoes a 
significant evolution as the writers establish the idea of a real versus collaborationist 
France. These writers are so obviously consumed with their opposition and sometimes 
97 Georges Bidault, Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault, Trans. Marianne Sinclair 
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their hatred for Vichy that they devote much of their own and the paper's efforts to 
exploring this betrayal and fighting collaboration. However, the images of the Germans 
as slave traders, remain fairly unimaginative and extremely stereotypical. It is almost as 
if the external German enemy becomes a secondary threat. Therefore, it is not worth 
their time to explore these German characteristics because they are more concerned with 
the mentality of collaboration. Perhaps that is why it is so much easier for these writers 
to simply stereotype all Germans as Nazis and not waste their time redefining these 
images when they are faced with their own countrymen's betrayal. 
The political agenda and the influence of General DeGaulle remain the third and 
perhaps the most powerful influence over Combat's portrayal of the French and 
Germans. Undoubtedly, his involvement and particularly his financial support were 
welcomed, a benefit to the paper and the Resistance movement. Once the partnership 
with DeGaulle was established in 1942, the purpose and the direction of the paper 
became more politically oriented. By March 1944 Combat claims that the aim of the 
paper is not just a French victory over German domination but the construction of the 
new strong and pure France which DeGaulle promises.99 The paper became all the more 
adamant in its them vs. us attitude, claiming that everyone who is not with us is against 
uS,too Moreover, Frenay readily admits in his autobiography that the goal of the paper 
was partly to instigate a social revolution with DeGaulle at its helm, creating the IV 
99 Combat, no. 55, March 1944. 
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Republic. 101 Thus, it seems as if DeGaulle planned on using the paper not only to 
encourage Resistance but to solicit votes. 
The influence of DeGaulle can best be illustrated in the portrayal of Germans and 
French collaborators as despicable characters. It would not be good for readers to see the 
writers of Combat, perhaps the most prestigious of Resistance movements, questioning, 
pondering, doubting and reflecting on these images or its o\vn methods by subverting its 
own authority or that ofDeGaulle. Indeed, these barbarians and traitors must be 
portrayed as such so that DeGaulle can be seen as the symbol of French freedom and its 
liberation. It is as if the writers of Combat have this objective clearly in mind as they 
prepare France for DeGaulle's triumphant stroll down the Champs-Elysees and the social 
revolution Frenay said was to come. 
It is not until late 1942 and the beginning of 1943 that the emphasis on the real 
France is established. Only after DeGaulle becomes involved does Combat explore the 
true differences and the "otherness" of the French collaborators. Contrasting the 
traitorous Vichy with Petain at its helm and the freedom-loving French led by Charles 
DeGaulle, Combat establishes the idea of1'no Frances, or more appropriately, the one 
real France, fu.~her promoting DeGaulle as the essence of the true Frencll.a.'11an. DeGaulle 
becomes "l'espoir de France, la voix qui n'ajamais vane," \vhereas Petain cannot speak 
1 1 . . fF 102 ........ 1 1 . d . fP r' 1 • 1 fil1 ,1 f tne language 0 rance. 1 ne u tImate con elnnatIon 0 etaln wnlcn I IS tne pages 0 
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\\Titers had certwinly been appalled at the betrayal of the French World \Var One hero and 
lUI Henri Frenay, introduction, The Night Will End by Henri Frenay, Trans. Don Hofstadter (New York: 
McC""1"aw-Hill, 1976) xv. 
102 Combat, no. 43, April 1943. 
34 
their own pro-Peminist stance early in the war. Until DeGaulle took over the 
underground movement, they did not utterly condemn Petain but seemed hopeful that he 
might change his ways. DeGaul1e, on the other hand, had been extremely aggressive 
towards Petain well before his official collaboration and infamous handshake with 
Hitler. 103 This change in attitude towards Petain was fully taken advantage of by 
DeGaulle's friends in Combat. 
The idea of true collaboration was also largely the result ofDeGaulle's influence 
and the political support he received from and in Combat. Though a succinct definition 
of collaboration is practically impossible to detennine because of the ambiguity of the 
French situation, the Resistant French only seem to condemn the major collaborationists 
figures actively involved in the government and, of course, the milice. 104 Throughout the 
paper's tumultuous history from 1941-1944 there are several "Consigne d' Action" and 
other various articles which call for total resistance during total war.105 Yet, the 
conclusion is never really drawn that no Resistance equals collaboration. Instead, the 
paper chooses to focus on the so-called major collaborators such as Petain, Laval, and 
Pucheu, emphasizing that they will be judged by the real France. However, there is very 
little mentioned about the role of those French men and women who claimed neutrality 
and attempted to get on with their lives, earning a living from day to day. 106 Moreover, 
the list of those collaborators to be "gotten" at the Liberation which appears in March 
103 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 70. 
104 The Milice served as a "French Gestapo" in the Unoccupied Zone. 
105 Combat, no. 55, March 1944. 
106 Combat, no. 58, July 1944. This issue contains the only article which addresses neutrality and excuses 
those who remained neutral by allowing them to think that they had been resistors in the past but now must 
become more active and quit believing that this fight did not concern them. 
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1944 certainly does not represent of all those who collaborated with the Nazis. 107 Once 
again this Gaullist influence and the organization's intention to propel France into a 
Gaullist Revolution are evident; thus, those men and women whose collaboration is not 
condemned by DeGaulle and Combat may openly support or transfer their support from 
Vichy to DeGaulle without condemnation. DeGaulle' s polished image is not tarnished 
in the least as he secures another group of supportive voters. Furthermore, this depiction 
and sort offorgiveness also increased DeGaulle's support among the French so that the 
fear of Allied, particularly American, intervention or further partitioning of France was 
no longer a real threat. These former collaborators and neutrals had changed their ways 
and earned forgiveness as explained by Combat and would rally to DeGaulle's side, now 
willing to fight for freedom from foreign domination. 
Undoubtedly, this allegiance to DeGaulle also resulted in the focus on French 
collaboration, rather than the German Occupation. Of course, France was fighting Nazi 
Germany, but DeGaulle was fighting for the leadership and control of France. There was 
no imminent need among his supporters in Combat to paint a horrible image of Germany; 
it had already been done beginning with the Franco-Prussian War. It was more important 
among Gaullists to create the contrasting images of a real versus collaborationist France, 
to excommunicate Petain with religious zeal, to pass judgement on the French 
collaborators in order to define the enemy, and to ultimately win support for the IV 
Republic whose origins are clearly found in Combat IS rich history as an exceptional 
Resistance publication. 
107 Combat, no. 55, March 1944. 
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Conclusion: Impact and Contribution 
The impact of the Resistance paper and its organization during the Occupation 
cannot be questioned. Though the articles in Combat were obviously influenced by 
several political, cultural, and geographical factors, it was by no means guilty of false 
reporting or pure sensationalism. Frenay and his companions on Combat were extremely 
intuitive and progressive in their journalistic efforts. Combat had long been aware of 
Hitler's intentions of racial enslavement discussed in Me in Kemp/as evidenced in 
Combat's first issue.108 Moreover, they were acutely aware of what was happening to 
those Frenchmen who agreed to work in German factories, not to mention the racist acts 
committed by the French themselves. Much of this information that was reported in 
Combat was not reported in Allied newspapers either because of ignorance or 
government censorship. 
Combat's impact on both other Resistance publications and the war effort was 
significant because of the information and leadership it provided for France. However, 
the precarious position of the Resistance movements in the Unoccupied Zone limited its 
circulation and its potential impact on those individuals and nations outside of France. 
Though copies were smuggled to DeGaulle in London and Algiers, they were not 
circulated in any other cities or countries. Sadly ~ the information concerning the 
concentration camps in France, Germany, and the East reported in Combat was not 
printed in many of the Allied countries. Perhaps if a copy of the paper or even this 
information had been distributed in Allied nations, it might have created widespread 
108 Combat, no. 1, December 1941. 
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awareness of these atrocities and hastened the Allies to invade the European continent 
prior to 1944 in order to save the lives of the French as well as other Europeans. 
Combat did not end its publication until 1947. It pursued its political agenda 
even after the Liberation and victory in Europe, but now in an open and decidedly more 
aggressive manner. With the war out of the way, the paper could devote itself to a 
multitude of different subjects, from French constitutional law to the principles of 
education refonn. 109 As a popularly recognized Resistance publication, Combat could 
claim legitimacy with which other papers could not compete. There was no question that 
the writers of Combat had bee actively resistant, proudly supporting DeGaulle throughout 
the Occupation. Combat's contribution proved to be just as important after the war as 
during the Occupation. 
The impact of the paper on France after the war, however, is extremely 
controversial. As a result of the Gaullist ideology of the paper, Combat often defined 
collaborators as primarily the prominent leaders in the Vichy government. Oftentimes, it 
was assumed that the free, resistant France was much larger than it actually had been; 
the circulation of the paper never went above 200,000. 110 Because of the ambiguity of 
the term collaboration, its definition is difficult to determine and easy to alter so that 
those claiming neutrality or just earning a living could be called resistants. Combat 
could easily be seen as DeGaulle's accomplice in creating the ultimately disastrous myth 
of a resistant France. 
109 James D. Wilkinson, The Intellectual Resistance in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981) 53. 
110 Margaret Atac~ Literature and the French Resistance: Cultural Politics and Narrative Forms, 1940-
1950 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1989) 31. 
38 
Because of the support the paper provided for DeGaulle and the definitions it 
used to characterize collaboration, Combat contributed to the Gaullist myth that France 
had been a nation of resistors. This myth proved to be ultimately disastrous because of 
the scars it left among the French. After the war France, as well as other nations, held 
criminal trials and paraded its traitors through the streets, believing that the nation had 
dealt with its guilt. DeGaulle along with the rest of France allowed many collaborators to 
go unpunished, believing that the traitors had been purged from society. The 
collaboration became a taboo subject, ignored and umeconciled an long Frenchmen. The 
ideology of Frenchness and its superiority established by Combat, separating Vichy from 
the real France, was thus abused by DeGaulle and others to conceal France's shame. 
Combat's images of collaboration contributed to this myth perpetuated by DeGaulle 
which left France divided for decades as Frenchmen refused to address their national 
guilt until the 1980' s. III Though it can be said that the images of Germans and French 
collaborators in Combat were the result of numerous influences both culturally and 
politically, Combat played just as significant a role in French politics after the Second 
World War and in France's inability to cope with the national guilt of collaboration. 
III Alan Morris, introduction, Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed: Writers and the Mode Retro in 
Post-Gaul/ist France by Alan Morris (New York: Berg, 1992) 1. 
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